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- (71) Applicant (for all designated States except US): **DELPHI TECHNOLOGIES HOLDING S.À.R.L.** [LU/LU]; Avenue de Luxembourg, L-4940 Bascharage (LU).
- (72) Inventors; and
- (75) Inventors/Applicants (for US only): **BURIKS, Adrian** [NL/GB]; 53 Woodside, Gillingham Kent ME8 0PL (GB). **LAMB, Rodney** [GB/GB]; 5 Amethyst Grove, Waterlooville, Hampshire PO7 8SR (GB).
- (74) Agent: **GREGORY, John**; Delphi Diesel Systems, Courteney Road, Gillingham, Kent ME8 0RU (GB).

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(54) Title: METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR VEHICLE SECURITY




Figure 2

(57) Abstract: A method and an engine control system adapted for securing a vehicle are described. An engine control unit (2) uses one or more items of static digital data that are stored in a first memory. An immobiliser (3) is adapted to ensure that any item stored in the first memory is protected against unauthorised modification.

METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR VEHICLE SECURITY

Field of Invention

The invention relates to methods and apparatus for vehicle security. More specifically, the
5 invention relates to security of data stored in computing systems of the vehicle.

Background to Invention

Vehicles including an internal combustion engine typically include computing systems important
to the effective operation of the vehicle. One such important system is an engine control unit
10 (ECU). This is an electronic control unit that controls engine operation and sets various
operational parameters, such as the composition of the fuel mixture, ignition timing, idle speed
and valve timing and control.

An ECU may be equipped with security functions to ensure that it is not subject to unauthorised
15 modification - if such modification is detected, the ECU may be adapted to disallow or otherwise
limit engine operation. Such security functions are provided in software in existing ECU designs,
as the additional cost and complexity of secure hardware prevents this from being a commercially
acceptable solution in this context. Such software security functions are open to attack by
modification of ECU data, reprogramming of the ECU or by physical replacement of the ECU.
20 This compromises the overall security of the vehicle, as these approaches can be used as a
tactic in acquiring illicit control of a vehicle.

It is desirable to provide a solution that prevents compromises to vehicle security which involve
bypassing ECU security functions.
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Summary of Invention

Accordingly, the invention provides a method of securing a vehicle, comprising: providing an
engine control unit, wherein one or more items of static digital data for use by the engine control
unit are stored in a first memory; and providing an immobiliser, whereby the immobiliser is
30 adapted to ensure that the one or more parameters stored in the first memory are protected
against unauthorised modification.

Advantageously, the immobiliser provides a root of trust for the engine control unit.

35 This approach prevents classes of activity that compromise vehicle security or modify
performance by modification to or attack on the ECU. By using the immobiliser - which by its
function is designed to be a relatively secure component adapted to be trusted by the user - to

guarantee security of the first memory, this places the root of trust for ECU function in the immobiliser, which improves vehicle security and user confidence. Immobilisers are required items in many jurisdictions, and will be constructed according to sufficiently high security standards to achieve effective function and to achieve a high level of certification (for example, to
5 reduce insurance premiums) that their use in this manner can be expected to increase the overall security of the system.

In one implementation, the immobiliser comprises the first memory, wherein if an attempt to modify or remove data in the first memory is made, the immobiliser provides an immobilisation
10 response to prevent effective function of the vehicle. To assist in this the one or more items may be stored in an encrypted form and/or the immobiliser memory may be physically protected against modification.

In an alternative implementation, the first memory is comprised within the engine control unit,
15 wherein the immobiliser checks the first memory to determine whether a value of the one or more items stored therein are valid, whereby if any value is not valid, the immobiliser provides an immobilisation response to prevent effective function of the vehicle.

This approach can be readily implemented with little modification to existing ECU and immobiliser
20 designs, and achieves a reliably secure result.

The first memory may be comprised within flash memory of the engine control unit. In this arrangement, the one or more items may be stored in encrypted form and decrypted by interaction with the immobiliser.
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The engine control unit may be adapted to restrict operation of the vehicle unless a validation routine is performed successfully, in which case the one or more items may comprise static data items used by the validation routine. The immobiliser may thus be used to assure the authenticity of parameters used in any type of secure validation of the ECU and its
30 communications. For example, the one or more items may comprise one or more public keys of a set of asymmetric encryption keys, wherein one or more public keys are used in the validation routine to determine whether measured values of engine control unit software or data communicated to the ECU correspond to values signed by corresponding private keys. These keys may for example be in a key pair, or may be in a group signature scheme. As another
35 example, the values may be a set of one or more secure hash values within the ECU used to validate software or data integrity. Alternative cryptographic solutions could be used, and relevant parameters protected under the approach described here.

The one or more data items may comprise code for execution by a processor of the engine control unit or static values of the engine control unit or both. This may be separate from the validation scheme altogether (related to other code altogether used in operation of the engine control unit), but for the validation scheme this may also allow other significant values - such as public keys, hash values, memory range constraints, digitally signed hash values, and/or digital signatures to be retained securely.

In a further aspect, the invention provides an engine control system for a vehicle, comprising: an engine control unit, wherein one or more items of static digital data for use by the engine control unit are stored in a first memory; and an immobiliser, whereby the immobiliser is adapted to ensure that the one or more items stored in the first memory are protected against unauthorised modification.

Advantageously, the immobiliser provides a root of trust for the engine control unit.

In one implementation, the first memory is comprised within the immobiliser.

In another implementation, the first memory is comprised within the engine control unit, and wherein the immobiliser is adapted to check the first memory to determine whether a value of the one or more items stored therein is valid, whereby if any value is not valid, the immobiliser is further adapted to provide an immobilisation response to prevent effective function of the vehicle.

In embodiments, the engine control unit is adapted to limit functionality or restrict operation of the vehicle unless a validation routine is performed successfully, wherein said one or more items comprise static data items used by the validation routine. In such approaches, said static data items may comprise one or more public keys of a key pair or key set, wherein the public key or keys are used in the validation routine to determine whether measured values of engine control unit software correspond to values signed by a corresponding private key.

Description of Specific Embodiments

Embodiments of the invention will now be described, by way of example, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

Figure 1 illustrates schematically relevant elements of a vehicle system;

Figure 2 illustrates schematically the relationship between an immobiliser and an engine control

unit according to an embodiment of the invention; and

Figure 3 illustrates schematically a method of operation of the immobiliser with respect to the engine control unit according to an embodiment of the invention.

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Figure 1 shows relevant elements of a typical vehicle system. The vehicle engine 1 operates under the control of an engine control unit (ECU) 2 that controls engine operation and sets various operational parameters of the engine 1. The ECU 2 interacts with other elements of the vehicle, linked by the vehicle's electrical system and network, and among these is the immobiliser 3. The immobiliser 3 is an electronic device that disables effective operation of the vehicle unless the correct token is present. This token is generally provided by a physical key 4 carried by the driver of the vehicle (the driver's vehicle key).

10

15 The ECU 2 is generally implemented as a circuit board comprising a CPU 5 and one or more memories 6 together with other electronic components. Software for operation of the ECU 2 is typically stored within this memory 6 (some portion may also be present within a dedicated memory within the CPU 5 itself). Typically the memory 6 comprises flash memory or EPROMs. The CPU 5 can therefore generally be reprogrammed by replacement of the software stored in the memory 6 (possibly also by addition of additional chips to provide specific functionality).

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An immobiliser 3 is a standard vehicle component, and in many jurisdictions the use of an immobiliser to protect against unauthorised use or theft is mandated (and in others it will determine insurance premiums). Many existing immobilisers apply cryptographic algorithms to assure the authenticity of physical components of the vehicle such as the vehicle key 4. If component authentication fails, immobilisers will disable effective function of the vehicle.

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The immobiliser 3 may take a variety of different approaches to disabling effective function of the vehicle. The immobiliser 3 will use one or more of these approaches as part of an immobilisation response when a trigger condition (such as an attempt to activate the vehicle without the correct token) is detected. The approaches taken vary depending on the specific design of immobiliser used and on the systems present within the vehicle. In some cases the immobiliser 3 uses portions of the ECU memory 6 and interacts with the ECU 2 to prevent operation of the engine 1, for example by the ECU 2 preventing fuel from flowing or ignition from taking place. While embodiments of the invention involve interaction between the ECU 2 and the immobiliser 3, it should be appreciated that embodiments of the invention do not require this to occur as a part of the normal immobilisation response of the immobiliser 3 to disable effective operation of the

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vehicle when a trigger condition is detected.

The interaction between the key 4 and the immobiliser 3 is typically of the following variety. The token within the key 4 comprises a stored value in a particular memory. On insertion into the proper place within the vehicle, the stored value is transmitted to the immobiliser 3. This may be done in one of a number of alternative ways. One way is simply for a direct electrical connection to be made between the relevant parts of the key and the immobiliser. A preferred approach is for the value to be stored in an RFID tag within the key 4. This tag is activated, and the value broadcast and sensed by or on behalf of the immobiliser 3 when the key is placed in the appropriate position in the vehicle. If the stored value is that expected by the immobiliser 3, the vehicle is allowed to operate, while otherwise, the immobilisation response is triggered.

In determining whether the stored value is that expected, some designs of immobiliser 3 may use the ECU memory 6. The correct (and so expected) value may be stored in a dedicated area of the ECU memory 6. The immobiliser 3 may also access the ECU 2 and the ECU memory 6 in performing an immobilisation response, for example in preventing the ECU 2 from allowing fuel pump activation or ignition.

The expected and hence stored values may be changed over time to increase the security of this system. The value may be changed between interactions by use of a rolling code system or by use of an advanced cryptographic solution such as a one-time pad. This may require cryptographic capability (such as a cryptographic processor and secure memory) within the immobiliser itself, or this capability may be provided in another component accessible to the immobiliser.

Figure 2 illustrates schematically the relationship between the immobiliser 3 and the ECU 2 in an embodiment of the invention. In this embodiment, the ECU 2 uses a digital signature scheme to ensure that the software used in the ECU 2 is as provided by the manufacturer or otherwise authorised. This may be achieved by generating a digital signature of specific code and storage of this information within the ECU memory 6 on manufacture. Generation of the signature takes place using a trusted private key (such as the private key used by the manufacturer for this purpose, and not revealed to other parties) and storage of both software and digital signature enables subsequent measurement. A private key is part of a key pair whose authenticity is assured using practices deemed adequately secure for the specific scenario. For example, key pair authenticity may be assured using a conventional PKI-based digital signature scheme, web of trust, or implementation of other physical protections and security protocols assuring authenticity while avoiding divulgence of the private key. Other embodiments may use different

arrangements – for example, a group signature scheme may be used in which more than one party has signature rights over all or part of the ECU. In this case, there may not be a simple one-to-one relationship between a private key and a public key – there may be multiple private keys associated with a single public key, or multiple public keys associated with a single private key.

One or more public keys, 21, corresponding to one or more private keys, are then stored so that they are accessible to the ECU 2, typically in a dedicated part of the ECU memory 6. Prior to acting upon requests to perform restricted operations (such as flashing an ECU or starting a vehicle) ECU 2 can use one or more public keys and digital signature validation algorithms to validate the authenticity of software and data available to ECU2 implementing the action. For software and data stored on the ECU, signature validation involves digital signatures stored in the ECU as shown in item 22 of figure 2. Prior to acting upon a request communicated to the ECU, a public key and digital signature validation algorithm can be used to verify that the request, software, and data received over a communication channel are authentic. In this case, the message rather than the ECU will typically contain the digital signature used for validation. In both scenarios, if digital information is not deemed authentic, the ECU 2 takes an appropriate action (which may include reducing engine performance, inhibiting ignition or fuel pump operation or otherwise limiting vehicle functionality).

This approach may be subverted in at least two ways. One way is to replace the entire ECU 2. If this is done, the whole digital signature scheme will be bypassed. Another way is to replace one or more public keys and digital signatures with new public keys and digital signatures when ECU software is modified. The new public key or keys are part of unauthorised key sets, with one or more private keys in each set held by the modifier. The modifier uses an illicit private key to generate signatures of the modified ECU software, and these new digital signatures are recorded to replace the original signatures. Although the digital signature validation algorithm used by the ECU has not been modified and continues to operate exactly as before, it will not detect the subversion. This escapes detection because although the ECU 2 can apply a digital signature verification algorithm to assure data has been signed with one or more private keys corresponding to public keys available to the algorithm, the ECU 2 is unable to guarantee that its own public keys are authentic. In the world of networked computers, this problem is often resolved by communications with a trusted third party to establish the authenticity of keys, for example by contacting a remote certificate authority which is part of a PKI. Such a mechanism is not available to most ECUs and its implementation increases costs. Therefore internal ECU data, typically public keys and certificates stored within the ECU itself, commonly serve as the root of trust for such embedded devices, and must be protected.

Some measure of security may be achieved by storing these sensitive values in a dedicated or secure memory (such as the memory of a tamperproof trusted platform module (TPM)) or with additional encryption (for example, based on a unique ECU identity number), but this adds
5 significant expense and may not be effective against a total replacement of the ECU.

Figure 2 shows how embodiments of the invention prevent these types of subversion.

Immobiliser 3 interacts with ECU 2 as normal, but also assumes responsibility for certain items of static data within the ECU 2 memory. In the case specifically considered here, this may involve
10 assumption of security of the public keys 21 of the ECU digital signature validation software, and possibly also for other static values of the ECU system (such as, for example secure hash values) though other static values significant to ECU function may also be stored in this way too). Other static data may be protected in the same way, such as code used by the ECU in operation (this may be in normal operation of the ECU and not just in operation of the digital signature scheme).

15 However, as the immobiliser 3 has responsibility for data required for operation of the digital signature scheme, neither ECU replacement nor replacement of the digital signature scheme of the ECU when software is replaced will be effective without subversion or replacement of the immobiliser 3 as well. This may be more problematic to achieve, as because the basic function of the immobiliser is to protect the vehicle, it will generally be well protected against physical attack
20 or other subversion. By moving the root of trust from the relatively insecure ECU 2 to a security device, the immobiliser 3, the cost to an attacker of modifying critical values to subvert security measures is increased. This leads to a lower frequency of attacks and improved vehicle security.

The amount of memory available to the immobiliser 3 and the communication path between the
25 immobiliser 3 and the ECU 2 may determine the amount of data protected. This may also determine whether an item of data is protected by protecting the data item itself at the immobiliser (more secure, but more demanding of space) or by storing a digital signature or secure hash of the data item (possibly less secure and requires additional processing, but less demanding of memory).

30 Alternative approaches to the protection of these values by the immobiliser 3 are possible. The immobiliser 3 may simply store these values in an immobiliser memory 25, and the ECU 2 obtain them from the immobiliser 3 as required either directly from the immobiliser memory 25 (provided that the ECU 2 is not able to write to this memory) or by request to an immobiliser processor 26 -
35 attempts to obtain these values other than as approved would trigger an immobilisation response. Alternatively, the immobiliser 3 may hold a digital signature or secure hash of these values in an immobiliser memory 25, and an immobiliser processor 26 may use a validation algorithm to

determine whether these values 25 correspond to those calculated from the code stored in the ECU memory 6. If validation and these values are not deemed authentic, an immobilisation response would be taken. This stored hash may also be a digital signature for which the immobiliser 3 holds a public key - in this way the digital signature scheme for the ECU 2 would
5 itself be secured by a digital signature scheme.

If provided with cryptographic capabilities, either through internal software or inclusion of a cryptographic coprocessor and secure memory (which may be present in some immobiliser solutions in order to provide a high level of security between the immobiliser 3 and the key 4 or
10 the ECU 2), then more advanced cryptographic solutions will be available. For example, short term key pairs and digital signatures could be generated to allow for the protection of dynamic data.

It is the role of the immobiliser to assure that a number of preconditions are met before allowing
15 normal operation. These preconditions may be tested in a serial order or in parallel depending upon design requirements and hardware capabilities. The order in which tests are performed may vary between implementations, Figure 3 illustrates the preferred embodiment of a serial process for operation of the immobiliser 3 when the key 4 is placed in position is set out in Figure 3. The immobiliser first determines 31 whether the key 4 provides a valid token, and if not it will trigger
20 an immobilisation response 40. The immobiliser then checks 32 the public key of the ECU digital signature scheme (and any other static values protected by the immobiliser) and again if the check fails this will trigger an immobilisation response 40. The ECU then checks 33 software values using the ECU digital signature scheme, and if these checks fail the ECU does not allow vehicle operation (or may even itself trigger an immobilisation response) – otherwise normal
25 vehicle function is permitted 34.

This cooperative use of the immobiliser and the ECU allows for more effective security, but it also has benefits at the test and manufacturing stage. Where the public keys for the ECU digital signing scheme are fixed in the ECU, this can cause difficulties during test and in some stages of
30 manufacture, where it may be desirable to make changes in the ECU software or to vary ECU parameters. The more securely public keys are stored within the ECU, the more problematic this approach becomes during test and manufacture. Placing control over the public key values in the immobiliser obviates this problem, as the immobiliser would generally not be connected in to the system until the ECU was complete. Test and the initial stages of manufacture can take place
35 without the presence of an immobiliser, allowing developers more freedom to make modifications.

Embodiments of the invention may therefore be used to provide enhanced security by

cooperative use of the immobiliser and the ECU, preventing attacks based on subversion or replacement of the ECU.

5 In the approach described here, the immobiliser serves as the root of trust for the ECU, and is used to authenticate digital assets in the form of static data values used by the ECU such as parameters of the ECU validation process. The ECU validation process may itself involve an authentication process, forming a chain of trust extending from the immobiliser through the ECU to additional physical and digital assets.

10 The immobiliser may also be used to serve as the root of trust for other computing devices within a vehicle (such as mobile communication equipment and digital media devices) and may protect various types of digital asset (software, calibration parameters, digital media, biometrics and any other form of digitally encoded data). This requires an appropriate communication path between the other computing device and the immobiliser, and will generally also require an appropriate
15 mechanism, such as a digital signature validation algorithm, at this computing device for checking that the digital asset has not been compromised before it is used.

CLAIMS

1. A method of securing a vehicle, comprising:

5 providing an engine control unit (2), wherein one or more items of static digital data for use by the engine control unit (2) are stored in a first memory (6, 25); and

10 providing an immobiliser (3), whereby the immobiliser (3) is adapted to ensure that the one or more items stored in the first memory (6,25) are protected against unauthorised modification.

2. A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the immobiliser (3) provides a root of trust for the engine control unit (2).

15 3. A method as claimed in claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the immobiliser (3) comprises the first memory (25), wherein if an attempt to modify or remove data in the first memory (25) is made, the immobiliser (3) provides an immobilisation response to prevent effective function of the vehicle.

20 4. A method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the one or more items are stored in an encrypted form and/or the immobiliser memory (25) is physically protected against modification.

25 5. A method as claimed in claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the first memory (6) is comprised within the engine control unit (2), and wherein the immobiliser (3) checks the first memory (6) to determine whether a value of the one or more items stored therein are valid, whereby if any value is not valid, the immobiliser (3) provides an immobilisation response to prevent effective function of the vehicle.

30 6. A method as claimed in claim 5, wherein the first memory (6) is comprised within flash memory of the engine control unit (2).

7. A method as claimed in claim 5 or claim 6, wherein the one or more items are stored in encrypted form and is decrypted by interaction with the immobiliser (3).

35 8. A method as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein the engine control unit (2) is adapted not to allow operation, or to limit performance, of the vehicle unless a validation routine is performed successfully, wherein said one or more items comprise static data items used by the validation routine.

9. A method as claimed in claim 8, wherein said static data items comprise a set of one or more public keys of a key pair or key set, wherein the public key or keys are used in the validation routine to determine whether measured values of engine control unit software correspond to values signed using one or more associated private keys.

10. A method as claimed in claim 8, wherein said one or more items comprise code for execution by a processor of the engine control unit (2) or static values of the engine control unit (2) or both.

11. An engine control system for a vehicle, comprising:

an engine control unit (2), wherein one or more items of static digital data for use by the engine control unit (2) are stored in a first memory (6,25); and

an immobiliser (3), whereby the immobiliser (3) is adapted to ensure that the one or items stored in the first memory (6,25) are protected against unauthorised modification.

12. An engine control system as claimed in claim 11, wherein the immobiliser (3) provides a root of trust for the engine control unit (2).

13. An engine control system as claimed in claim 11 or claim 12, wherein the first memory (25) is comprised within the immobiliser (3).

14. An engine control system as claimed in claim 11 or claim 12, wherein the first memory (6) is comprised within the engine control unit (2), and wherein the immobiliser (3) is adapted to check the first memory (6) to determine whether a value of the public key stored therein is valid, whereby if the value is not valid, the immobiliser (3) is further adapted to provide an immobilisation response to prevent effective function of the vehicle.

15. An engine control system as claimed in any of claims 11 to 14, wherein the engine control unit (2) is adapted to restrict operation of the vehicle unless a validation routine is performed successfully, wherein said one or more items comprise static data items used by the validation routine.

16. An engine control system as claimed in claim 15, wherein said static data items comprise one or more public keys of a key pair or key set, wherein the public key or keys are used in the

validation routine to determine whether measured values of engine control unit software correspond to values signed using one or more associated private keys.

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


Figure 1




Figure 2

2/2




Figure 3

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

International application No

PCT/EP2012/051779

A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER
 INV. B60R25/04
 ADD.

According to International Patent Classification (IPC) or to both national classification and IPC

B. FIELDS SEARCHED

Minimum documentation searched (classification system followed by classification symbols)
 B60R

Documentation searched other than minimum documentation to the extent that such documents are included in the fields searched

Electronic data base consulted during the international search (name of data base and, where practical, search terms used)

EPO-Internal

C. DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT

Category*	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
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A	EP 2 045 151 A1 (HONDA MOTOR CO LTD [JP]) 8 April 2009 (2009-04-08) paragraphs [0002], [0004], [0006], [0007], [0008]; figures 1,4,5 -----	1-14
A	DE 198 50 454 A1 (SIEMENS AG [DE]) 11 May 2000 (2000-05-11) column 3, line 36 - line 66 -----	1-14
X	EP 1 840 370 A2 (DENSO CORP [JP]) 3 October 2007 (2007-10-03) figure 1 ----- -/-	1,10



Further documents are listed in the continuation of Box C.



See patent family annex.

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Date of the actual completion of the international search

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16/04/2012

Name and mailing address of the ISA/

European Patent Office, P.B. 5818 Patentlaan 2
 NL - 2280 HV Rijswijk
 Tel. (+31-70) 340-2040,
 Fax: (+31-70) 340-3016

Authorized officer

Kyriakides, Leonidas

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

International application No

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C(Continuation). DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT

Category*	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
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INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

Information on patent family members

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