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(54) Title: FUZZY WHITELISTING ANTI-MALWARE SYSTEMS AND METHODS

FIG. 1

(57) Abstract: In some embodiments, an anti-malware system accounts for benign differences between non- malicious data objects,
such as differences introduced by compilers and other polymorphisms. A target object is separated into a multitude of code blocks,
and a hash is calculated for each code block. The obtained set of target hashes is then compared against a database of hashes corres -
ponding to code blocks extracted from whitelisted objects. A target object may be labeled as whitelisted (trusted, non-malicious) if it
has a substantial number of hashes in common with a whitelisted object. Objects which are slightly different from known whitelisted
objects may still receive whitelisting status. By allowing a certain degree of mismatch between the sets of hashes of distinct objects,
some embodiments of the present invention increase the efficiency of whitelisting without an unacceptable decrease in safety.

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Fuzzy Whitelisting Anti-Malware Systems and Methods

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION(S)

[0001] This application claims the benefit of the filing date of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/554,859, filed on 11/02/201 1, which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

[0002] The invention relates to systems and methods for protecting users from malicious software, and in particular to software whitelisting.

[0003] Malicious software, also known as malware, affects a great number of computer systems worldwide. In its many forms such as computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and rootkits, malware presents a serious risk to millions of computer users, making them vulnerable to loss of data, identity theft, and loss of productivity, among others.

[0004] Computer programs dedicated to malware scanning employ various methods of detecting and eliminating malware from user computer systems. Such methods include behavior-based techniques and content-based techniques. Behavior-based methods may involve allowing a suspected program to execute in an isolated virtual environment, identifying malicious behavior, and blocking the execution of the offending program. In content-based methods, the contents of a suspected file are commonly compared to a database of known malware-identifying signatures. If a known malware signature is found in the suspected file, the file is labeled as malicious.

[0005] Other methods of combating malware employ application whitelisting, which comprises maintaining a list of software and behaviors that are allowed on a user's computer system, and blocking all other applications from executing. Such methods are particularly effective agairut

polymorphic malware, which is able to randomly modify its malware-identifying signature, rendering conventional content-based methods ineffective.

[0006] Some whitelisting applications employ hash values to identify and ensure the integrity of whitelisted software. A cryptographic hash may be created for a file or group of files affiliated with a whitelisted application and stored for reference. The respective application is then authenticated by comparing the stored hash to a new hash generated at runtime.

[0007] The performance of anti-malware whitelisting methods may depend on the capability to maintain and update whitelist databases in a efficient and flexible manner.

SUMMARY

[0008] According to one aspect, a method comprises performing at a client computer system an initial malware scan of a plurality of target objects of the client computer system; and, in response to a tentative determination by the initial malware scan that the target object is suspected of being malicious: generating at the client computer system a plurality of target hashes of the target object, each target hash representing a distinct code block of the target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor instructions of the target object; sending from the client computer system the plurality of target hashes to a server computer system connected to the client computer system over a wide area network; and receiving at the client computer system from the server computer system a server-side indicator of whether the target object is malicious. The server-side indicator is generated by the server computer system by: for at least a target hash of the plurality of target hashes, retrieving a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a set of whitelisted objects according to the target hash, and when the plurality of target hashes is not identical to the plurality of reference hashes, determining a similarity score according to a count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes; and when the similarity score exceeds a predetermined threshold, designating the target object as non-malicious.

[0009] According to another aspect, a method comprises receiving at a server computer system a plurality of target hashes of a target object of a client computer system connected to the server

computer system over a wide area network; generating at the server computer system a server-side indicator of whether the target object is malicious; and sending to the client computer system the server-side indicator of whether the target object is malicious. The plurality of target hashes are generated at the client computer system in response to a tentative determination by the client computer system that the target object is suspected of being malicious, the tentative determination resulting from an initial malware scan of a plurality of target objects of the client computer system. Generating at the server computer system a server-side indicator of whether the target object is malicious comprises: for at least a target hash of the plurality of target hashes, retrieving a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a set of whitelisted objects according to the target hash, and when the plurality of target hashes is not identical to the plurality of reference hashes, determining a similarity score according to a count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes, and when the similarity score exceeds a predetermined threshold, designating the target object as non-malicious.

[0010] According to another aspect, a method comprises receiving at a server computer system a plurality of target hashes of a target object, each target hash representing a distinct code block of the target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor instructions of the target object; for at least a target hash of the plurality of target hashes, employing the server computer system to: retrieve a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a set of whitelisted objects according to the target hash, and when the plurality of target hashes is not identical to the plurality of reference hashes, determine a similarity score according to a count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes; and when the similarity score exceeds a predetermined threshold, employing the server computer system to label the target object as non-malicious.

[0011] According to another aspect, a computer system comprises at least a processor programmed to receive a plurality of target hashes, each target hash representing a distinct code block of a target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor instructions of the target object; for at least a target hash of the plurality of target hashes: retrieve a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a set of

whitelisted objects according to the target hash, and when the plurality of target hashes is not identical to the plurality of reference hashes, determine a similarity score according to a count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes; and when the similarity score exceeds a predetermined threshold, label the target object as non-malicious.

[0012] According to another aspect, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium encodes instructions which, when executed on a processor, cause the processor to perform the steps of: receiving a plurality of target hashes, each target hash representing a distinct code block of a target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor instructions of the target object; for at least a target hash of the plurality of target hashes, retrieving a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a set of whitelisted objects according to the target hash; when the plurality of target hashes is not identical to the plurality of reference hashes, determining a similarity score according to a count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes. When the similarity score exceeds a predetermined threshold, the target object is non-malicious.

[0013] According to another aspect, a computer system comprises: means for receiving a plurality of target hashes, each target hash representing a distinct code block of a target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor instructions of the target object; means for retrieving a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a set of whitelisted objects according to a selected target hash of the plurality of target hashes; means for determining a similarity score according to a count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes; and means for labeling the target object as non-malicious according to the similarity score.

[0014] According to another aspect, a method comprises receiving at a server computer system a plurality of target hashes, each target hash representing a distinct data block of a target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor instructions of the target object; in response to receiving the plurality of target hashes, retrieving a plurality of reference hashes representing a whitelisted data object, and when the plurality of target hashes is not identical to

the plurality of reference hashes, when the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes share a majority of items, labeling the target object as non-malicious.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0015] The foregoing aspects and advantages of the present invention will become better understood upon reading the following detailed description and upon reference to the drawings where:

[0016] Fig. 1 shows an exemplary anti-malware system according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0017] Fig. 2 illustrates an exemplary hardware configuration of a client computer system according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0018] Fig. 3 shows an exemplary hardware configuration of an anti-malware server system according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0019] Fig. 4 shows a diagram of an exemplary anti-malware application executing on the client computer system according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0020] Fig. 5 shows exemplary applications executing on the anti-malware server system according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0021] Fig. 6 illustrates an exemplary sequence of steps performed by the client anti-malware application of Fig. 4 according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0022] Fig. 7 shows an example of code normalization according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0023] Fig. 8 shows an exemplary memory representation of a processor instruction according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0024] Fig. 9 shows an exemplary code block and an exemplary opcode pattern corresponding to the code block according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0025] Fig. 10 illustrates an exemplary fragment of code comprising a plurality of code blocks and an exemplary object data indicator (ODI) corresponding to the fragment of code, according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0026] Fig. 11 shows an exemplary sequence of steps performed by the server anti-malware application of Fig. 5 according to some embodiments of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0027] In the following description, it is understood that all recited connections between structures can be direct operative connections or indirect operative connections through intermediary structures. A set of elements includes one or more elements. Any recitation of an element is understood to refer to at least one element. A plurality of elements includes at least two elements. Unless otherwise required, any described method steps need not be necessarily performed in a particular illustrated order. A first element (e.g. data) derived from a second element encompasses a first element equal to the second element, as well as a first element generated by processing the second element and optionally other data. Making a determination or decision according to a parameter encompasses making the determination or decision according to the parameter and optionally according to other data. Unless otherwise specified, an indicator of some quantity/data may be the quantity/data itself, or an indicator different from the quantity/data itself. Computer programs described in some embodiments of the present invention may be stand-alone software entities or sub-entities (e.g., subroutines, code objects) of other computer programs. Unless otherwise specified, a target object is a file or a process residing on a client computer system. An identifier of a target object comprises data that allows the selective identification and retrieval of the target object itself, not merely as part of a larger data structure such as the entire memory of a client computer system. Unless otherwise specified, an object data indicator (ODI) of a target object comprises features of the target object data *(e.g.,* a code block, an opcode pattern, a hash) conducive to determining whether the target object is malicious, e.g. infected with malware. Unless otherwise specified, a hash is an output of a hash function. Hash functions are mathematical transformations mapping sequences of symbols (e.g. characters, bits) into shorter sequences of numbers or bit strings. A target hash is a hash computed on data of a target object. Unless otherwise specified, the term whitelisted is

understood to mean trusted to be clean, i.e. not containing malware. A first set is identical to a second set when all elements of the first set are contained in the second set, and all elements of the second set are contained in the first set. Computer readable media encompass non-transitory media such as magnetic, optic, and semiconductor storage media (e.g. hard drives, optical disks, flash memory, DRAM), as well as communications links such as conductive cables and fiber optic links. According to some embodiments, the present invention provides, *inter alia,* computer systems comprising hardware (e.g. one or more processors) programmed to perform the methods described herein, as well as computer-readable media encoding instructions to perform the methods described herein.

[0028] The following description illustrates embodiments of the invention by way of example and not necessarily by way of limitation.

[0029] Fig. **1** shows an exemplary malware detection system **10** according to some embodiments of the present invention. System **10** comprises a set of anti-malware (AM) server systems **20a-c** and a set of client computer systems **30a-b.** Client computer systems **30a-b** may represent end-user computers each having a processor, memory, and storage, and running an operating system such as Windows®, MacOS® or Linux. Some client computer systems **30a-b** may represent mobile computing and/or telecommunication devices such as tablet PCs and mobile telephones. In some embodiments, client computer systems **30a-b** may represent individual customers, or several client computer systems may belong to the same customer. In some embodiments, one of systems **30a-b** may be a server computer such as a mail server, in which case malware detection services may be used to identify malware present in emails or other messages sent to multiple clients, and to take appropriate action (e.g. remove or quarantine malware-infected items) before the messages are delivered to the clients. A network **12** connects client computer systems **30a-c** and anti-malware server systems **20a-c.** Network **12** may be a wide-area network such as the Internet. Parts of network **12**, for example a part of network **12** interconnecting client computer systems **30a-b,** may also include a local area network (LAN).

[0030] Fig. **2** shows an exemplary hardware configuration of a client computer system **30.** In some embodiments, system **30** comprises a processor **24,** a memory unit **26,** a set of input

devices **28,** a set of output devices **32,** a set of storage devices **34,** and a communication interface controller **36,** all connected by a set of buses **38.**

[0031] In some embodiments, processor **24** comprises a physical device (e.g. multi-core integrated circuit) configured to execute computational and/or logical operations with a set of signals and/or data. In some embodiments, such logical operations are delivered to processor **24** in the form of a sequence of processor instructions (e.g. machine code or other type of software). Memory unit **26** may comprise volatile computer-readable media (e.g. RAM) storing data/signals accessed or generated by processor **24** in the course of carrying out instructions. Input devices **28** may include computer keyboards and mice, among others, allowing a user to introduce data and/or instructions into system **30.** Output devices **32** may include display devices such as monitors. In some embodiments, input devices **28** and output devices **32** may share a common piece of hardware, as in the case of touch-screen devices. Storage devices **34** include computer-readable media enabling the non-volatile storage, reading, and writing of software instructions and/or data. Exemplary storage devices **34** include magnetic and optical disks and flash memory devices, as well as removable media such as CD and/or DVD disks and drives. Communication interface controller **36** enables system **30** to connect to a computer network and/or to other machines/computer systems. Typical communication interface controllers **36** include network adapters. Buses **38** collectively represent the plurality of system, peripheral, and chipset buses, and/or all other circuitry enabling the inter-communication of devices **24-36** of computer system **30.** For example, buses **38** may comprise the northbridge bus connecting processor **24** to memory **26,** and/or the southbridge bus connecting processor **24** to devices **28-36,** among others.

[0032] Fig. **3** shows a hardware configuration of an exemplary AM server system **20** of systems **20a-c,** according to some embodiments of the present invention. AM server system **20** may be a computer system comprising a server processor **124,** a server memory **126,** a set of server storage devices **134,** and a server communication interface controller **136,** all connected to each other via a set of server buses **138.** Although some details of hardware configuration may differ between server system **20** and client computer system **30,** the scope of devices **124, 126,**

134, 136 and **138** may be similar to that of devices **24, 26, 34, 36** and **38** described above, respectively.

[0033] Client computer system **30** may include a client anti-malware (AM) application **40** and a client-side cache-**56,** as shown in Fig. **4.** In some embodiments, client AM application **40** may be a stand-alone application, or may be an anti-malware module of a security suite having antivirus, firewall, anti-spam, and other modules. Client AM application may comprise an active AM scanner **42,** a static AM scanner **44,** an emulator **46** connected to static AM scanner **44,** a code normalization engine **48** connected to scanners **42** and **44,** a client AM communication manager **52** and a hashing engine **54** connected to communication manager **52** and code normalization engine **48.**

[0034] In some embodiments, client AM application **40** is configured to conduct a client-side part of a client-server collaborative scan to detect malware stored on computer-readable media forming part of client computer system **30** (e.g. memory, hard drive), or on computer-readable media connected to system **30** (e.g. memory stick, external hard drive, network devices, etc.). As part of a client-server collaborative scan, client AM application **40** is configured to send a target object data indicator (ODI) **100** to AM server systems **20a-c** and to receive a scan report **50** from systems **20a-c.**

[0035] Target objects scanned by AM application **40** include computer files and processes. Each process may include a set of loaded memory modules (i.e. loaded images of a target executable file and its referenced dynamic linked libraries), as well as any additional files corresponding to the loaded memory modules. A target object may be considered malware if it contains at least a part of a malicious software entity (e.g. virus, worm, Trojan).

[0036] In some embodiments, ODI **100** comprises a plurality of code block indicators, each code block indicator indicative of a distinct code block of the target object. Exemplary contents and formats of ODI **100** will be discussed in detail in relation to Figs. **7-9.**

[0037] In some embodiments, scan report **50** includes an identifier *(e.g.,* tag, file ID) of the target object, a malware status indicator *(e.g.,* infected, clean, unknown) of the target object, and/or a

set of identifiers of malware agents infecting the target object, such as names of individual malware agents *(e.g.,* Win32.Worm.Downadup.Gen), malware class indicators (virus, rootkit, etc.), or pointers to the respective agents in a malware knowledgebase. In some embodiments, a single scan report may be compiled for a batch of target objects.

[0038] In some embodiments, server communication manager 52 is configured to manage communication with server AM systems 20a-c. For example, manager 52 may establish connections over network 12, send and receive data to/from AM servers 20a-c, maintain a list of ongoing scan transactions, and associate target ODIs 100 with AM servers carrying out the server-side scanning.

[0039] Active AM scanner 42 and static AM scanner 44 enable client AM application 40 to rua a preliminary anti-malware scan of the target object, as shown in more detail below. If the preliminary scan detects malicious content, the offending target object is reported to the user directly, without having to go through client-server scanning, thus saving time and computer resources. In some embodiments, file target objects are handled by static AM scanner 44, while process target objects are handled by active AM scanner 42. In some embodiments, static AM scanner 44 may use emulator 46 to unpack a file and execute it in a protected environment, apart from main memory. Scanners 42, 44 may use behavior-based methods, various heuristics, content-based methods (e.g. signature matching), or a combination thereof, to determine whether the target object is malware. Examples of heuristic criteria for determining whether a target object is malicious comprise, among others, the relative sizes of various sections in the portable executable (PE) file of the target object, the information density in each section, the presence of specific flags and flag groups in the PE header, information about the packer/protector (if any), and the presence of certain text patterns inside the executable.

[0040] Client AM application 40 may employ code normalization engine 48 and hashing engine 54 to produce target ODI 100. The operation of code normalization engine 48 will be discussed below in relation to Fig. 7. Hashing engine 54 is configured to receive an opcode pattern and to generate a hash of the respective opcode pattern, as shown in relation to Figs. 8-9. In some embodiments, a hash is the output of a hash function, a mathematical transformation

mapping a sequence of symbols (e.g. characters, bits) into a sequence of numbers or bit string. Exemplary hash functions employed by hashing engine **54** include cyclic redundancy check (CRC), message digest (MD), or secure hashing (SHA), among others. An exemplary hash is the 4-byte CRC32.

[0041] Some embodiments of client-side cache **56** comprise, at any given time, a repository of ODIs corresponding to target objects residing on the respective client system **30,** objects having already been scanned for malware. In some embodiments, cache **56** may comprise a set of hashes of target object ODIs; each ODI received from client systems **30** may be hashed, with duplicate hashes removed, and resulting hashes stored as unique indicators of the respective ODIs. Cache **56** allows for a speed-up of malware scanning. If the ODI or hash thereof of a target object is found in client cache **56,** indicating that the respective target object has already been scanned at least once, the malware status of the target object may be retrieved directly from cache **56** and reported to the user, a process considerably faster than performing a new scan of the target object. For every ODI, some embodiments of cache **56** may comprise an object identifier *(e.g. ,* tag, file ID), and an indicator of malware status of the respective target object.

[0042] Fig. **5** shows exemplary applications executing on AM server system **20** according to some embodiments of the present invention. In some embodiments, system **20** comprises a server AM application **60,** a server-side cache **68,** a whitelist database **65,** a malware database **66,** and an outbreak database **67b,** all connected to AM server application **60.**

[0043] In some embodiments, AM server application **60** is configured to perform a plurality of malware detection transactions with client computer systems **30a-b.** For each such transaction, server AM application **60** is configured to conduct a server-side part of a collaborative scan to detect malware residing on the respective client computer system, as described in detail below. As part of a client-server transaction, application **60** receives target ODI **100** from the client computer system, and transmits scan report **50** to the respective client computer system. Server AM application **60** may comprise a server AM communication manager **62** and a code comparator **64** connected to communication manager **62.**

[0044] In some embodiments, server communication manager **62** is configured to manage communication with client computer systems **30a-b.** For example, manager **62** may establish connections over network **12,** send and receive data to/from clients, maintain a list of ongoing scan transactions, and associate target ODIs **100** with originating client computer systems **30a-b.** Code comparator **64** is configured to compute a similarity score indicating a degree of similarity between a target object and a set of reference objects stored in databases **65-67,** as described in detail below.

[0045] In some embodiments, server-side cache **68** comprises a repository of ODIs of target objects having already been scanned for malware, ODIs received from various client computer systems **30a-b** in the course of previous client-server collaborative scans. As discussed further below, if the ODI of a target object is found in server cache **68,** indicating that the respective target object has already been scanned at least once, the malware status (e.g. clean, infected, etc.) of the target object may be retrieved from cache **68** without performing a new scan of the target object. Along with target ODIs, some embodiments of server cache **68** may store the malware status (e.g. clean, infected) of the respective target object.

[0046] Databases **65-67** are maintained as repositories of current malware-related knowledge. In some embodiments, each database **65-67** comprises a set of data indicators corresponding to a collection of reference objects (files and processes) of known malware status. In some embqdiments, databases **65-67** store data in the form of opcode pattern hashes (described further below in relation to Figs. **7-10).** Whitelist database **65** includes a set of hashes retrieved from objects which are trusted to be clean *(i.e.,* whitelisted items). Malware database **66** comprises malware-identifying hashes retrieved from objects known as malware. In some embodiments, outbreak database **67** comprises hashes computed for objects which are of unknown malware status (not yet recognized as malware or clean).

[0047] In some embodiments, all opcode pattern hashes stored in databases **65-67** have the same size (e.g. 4 bytes). They may be stored sequentially in the memory and/or computer-readable media of server systems **20a-c.** In some embodiments, a second data structure comprising object identifiers (e.g., file IDs also represented as 4 byte numbers) is stored alongside the set of

reference hashes. A bi-directional mapping stored in the memory of the respective AM server is used to relate each hash to the file ID of the object it was retrieved from. This allows server AM application to selectively retrieve reference hashes, to determine whether target objects received from client computer systems are similar to any reference objects stored in databases **65-67.**

5   Databases **65-67** are being kept up-to-date by addition of target object data received from client computer systems **30a-b,** as further described below.

[0048] Fig. **6** shows an exemplary sequence of steps performed by client AM application **40** according to some embodiments of the present invention. In a step **202,** application **40** selects a target object to scan for malware. In some embodiments, target objects may be specified directly

10   or indirectly by a user (on-demand scanning). For example, the user may instruct AM application **40** to scan a certain file, or the contents of a certain folder, or the contents stored on a certain computer-readable medium (e.g. CDROM, flash memory device). Other exemplary target objects are selected during on-access scanning, wherein application **40** is configured to scan certain types of files or processes before reading/loading/launching them. In some

15   embodiments, a set of target objects may be compiled for the purpose of a scheduled scan of the client computer system running application **40.** Such an exemplary set of target objects residing on a client system running Microsoft Windows® may include executable files from the WINDIR folder, executables from the WINDIR/system32 folder, executables of the currently running processes, dynamic link libraries (DLL) imported by the currently running processes, and

20   executables of all installed system services, among others. In some embodiments, target objects may also include files/processes targeted by malware programs of interest, for example malware programs considered most widespread and active at the time of initiation of the respective malware scan.

[0049] In some embodiments, an identifier *(e.g.,* file ID) is used to uniquely tag the respective

25   target object. The identifier comprises data allowing a selective identification of the target object itself *(e.g.,* a file or process), and not as part of a larger structure such as *e.g.* the entire memory of the respective client computer system. Exemplary target object identifiers comprise file paths and memory addresses, among others. The identifier also allows client AM application **40** to

selectively retrieve the target object, in order to compute target ODI 100, as well as to unambiguously perform client-server scan transactions with multiple target objects.

[0050] In a step 204 (Fig. 6), client AM application 40 may run a preliminary anti-malware scan of the target object. In some embodiments, file target objects are handled by static AM scanner 44, while process target objects are handled by active AM scanner 42. Scanners 42, 44 may use behavior methods (e.g., emulation), various heuristics (e.g., the geometry of a portable executable header of the target object), content-based methods (e.g. signature matching), or a combination thereof, to determine whether the target object is maiware. In some embodiments, scanners 42, 44 may produce an indicator of the maiware status of the target object. Exemplary status indicators include malicious, suspected of being malicious, and clean, among others.

[0051] In some embodiments, a target object may be suspected of being malicious when the target object has some features in common with known malicious objects, but not enough to be considered maiware. Exemplary suspicious features include the presence within the PE header of the target object of certain values/value pairs, the presence within the target object of certain code sequences (e.g., code that checks whether the target object is executing within a virtual environment), and the presence of malware-identifying text patterns (signatures) such as common passwords and names and/or path indicators of anti-malware software, among others. Other suspicious features may comprise certain malware-identifying behavior patterns of the target object.

[0052] In some embodiments, scanners 42, 44 compute a maiware score for the respective target object, wherein each malware-identifying feature may be given a specific weight. When the maiware score exceeds a first threshold, the respective target object may be suspected of being malicious; when the score exceeds a second, higher threshold, the target object may be labeled as maiware. An exemplary target object containing strings specific to the IRC protocol, names of antivirus programs, common Windows® passwords, and code sequences specific to exploits may receive a comparatively high maiware score, and may therefore be labeled maiware, while another exemplary target object, which only contains the names of some anti-malware applications, may receive a relatively low score, but may still be suspected of being malicious.

[0053] In a step **206,** application **40** determines whether the target object is malicious according to the preliminary malware scan. If no, the operation of application **40** proceeds to a step **210** described below. If yes, in a step **208,** AM application **40** labels the target object as malware and updates client-side cache **56** accordingly, in a step **230.** Next, client AM application **40** outputs the result of the malware scan in a step **232.**

[0054] In some embodiments, step **232** may comprise issuing an alert *(e.g.,* a pop-up window) to inform the user that the respective client computer system may be infected. Alternatively, application **40** may document the malware scan in a system log. Some embodiments of AM application **40** may display a scan report to the user, the report comprising, among others, the name (or object identifier) of the target object, an indicator of the type of malware detected, and additional information regarding the respective malware (e.g. possible cleanup methods).

[0055] In step **210,** client AM application **40** may determine whether the target object is suspected of being malicious according to a result of the preliminary scan (see step **204** above). If yes, the operation proceeds to a step **212** discussed below. If no, in a step **228,** application **40** may label the target object as non-malicious (clean) and proceed to step **230.**

[0056] In step **212,** when the target object is a file, application **40** may load the target file in a protected environment provided by emulator **46,** to remove any layers of packing and/or encryption protecting the code of the target object. When the target object is a process, the operation of application **40** may skip step **212,** since the target object will already be loaded into system memory.

[0057] In a step **214,** code normalization engine **48** performs a code normalization of the target object. Compilers can generate different machine code from the same block of source code depending on the compilation parameters used, particularly due to code optimization. Additional code variations may be introduced by protector/polymorphic malware. In some embodiments, code normalization comprises transforming the set of processor instructions forming the target object into a standardized set of processor instructions, to remove variations of computer code introduced by compilation and/or other polymorphisms. An exemplary code normalization operation may proceed as follows:

[0058] 1.   The compiler used to build the target object is detected according to certain features of the target object. When the compiler is known, a location of the object-specific code inside the memory image of the target object is determined. When the compiler cannot be determined, the target areas for code extraction are selected so as to cover as many potential object-specific code locations as possible (e.g., entry point, beginning of first section, beginning of all sections etc.).

[0059] 2.   Code disassembly begins at the location found in the previous step. In some embodiments, code disassembly follows code branches *(e.g.,* JMP/Jxx/CALL in x86 code). The disassembled instructions are processed in sequence. As part of the normalization process, some instructions are left unchanged and others are altered. Exemplary alterations include:

a.   register IDs are replaced, based on the order in which they appear inside the function block;

b.   constant values and offsets are eliminated;

c.   PUSH followed by POP sequences are replaced with MOV instructions;

d.   Sequences which set the value of a variable/register/memory address to 0 (e.g. XOR <item>, <item>) are replaced with MOV <item>, 0;

e.   Addition/subtraction of 1 or 2 is replaced with one or two INC/DEC instructions, respectively.

f.   JZ/JNZ instructions are replaced with JE/JNE instructions, respectively;

g.   Function prologues and epilogues are removed;

h.   Instruction classes CMP, MOV and TEST are removed;

i.   Non-operations (ADD and SUB with 0; NOP etc.) are removed.

[0060] Fig. **7** shows an example of code normalization, according to some embodiments of tie present invention. A fragment of code disassembled from an exemplary target object comprises

a function block **70.** In some embodiments, function blocks start with a PUSH EBP; MOV EBP, ESP instruction sequence and they end with POP EBP. Each line of code (processor instruction) from function block **70** is modified according to the prescription listed on the right, to produce a corresponding normalized function block **72.**

[0061] In a step **216** (Fig. **6**), client AM application **40** computes an object data indicator (ODI) of the target object. In some embodiments, the ODI comprises a plurality of code block indicators, each code block indicator indicative of a distinct code block of the target object. An exemplary code block indicator comprises an opcode pattern of the respective code block.

[0062] In some embodiments, a code block comprises a sequence of consecutive processor instructions, the sequence extracted from the normalized code of the target object. In some embodiments, code blocks comprise a predetermined, code-independent number of instructions. Alternatively, the count of instructions within a code block varies within a predetermined range. Exemplary code blocks comprise between 5 and 50 contiguous instructions. In soine embodiments, the size (*e.g.,* number of instructions) of code blocks is substantially smaller than the size of function blocks, so that a function block may comprise more than one code block. En some embodiments, code blocks start either at the start of a function block, or at a CALL instruction. An exemplary code block **74** is shown in Fig. **7.**

[0063] In some embodiments, step **216** comprises separating the target object into code blocks, and extracting a set of opcode indicators from each such code block. Fig. **8** shows an exemplary binary memory representation of a processor instruction **80** (illustrated for the Intel® x86, 32bit family of processors). In some embodiments, each processor instruction is stored in memory as a sequence of bytes, the sequence comprising a set of instruction fields, such as a Prefix field **82a,** a couple of Opcode fields **82b-c,** a Mod/Reg/R/M field **82d,** and a Displacement/Data field **82e.** In some embodiments, Opcode fields **82b-c** encode the type of instruction (e.g., MOV, PUSH, etc.), while fields **82a, 82d-e** encode various instruction parameters (e.g. register names, memory addresses, etc.). In some embodiments, such as the x86 format, the byte size and content of instruction fields are instruction-dependent, and therefore the instructions for the x86 architecture are of varying lengths. The instruction illustrated in Fig. **8** (XOR CL, 12H)

comprises only the first Opcode byte (10000000 for XOR), the Mod/Reg/R/M byte (1 11 10001 for register CL), and the Displacement/Data byte (00010010 is binary for 12H), while other instructions may comprise both opcode fields, or other combinations of Prefix, Opcode, Mod, Reg and/or Data fields.

[0064] Fig. **9** shows an exemplary opcode pattern **90** corresponding to code block **74.** In some embodiments, opcode pattern **90** is a data structure (e.g. byte sequence, list, etc.) comprising a set of opcode indicators **92,** each opcode indicator corresponding to a processor instruction of normalized code block **74.** Exemplary opcode indicators **92** comprise the contents of the Opcode fields of the respective processor instruction, in which case opcode pattern **90** comprises a sequence of instruction types making up the respective code block. In the embodiment illustrated in Fig. **9,** each opcode indicator **92** comprises a combination of opcode bytes and parameter bytes (for example, the opcode indicator for instruction PUSH EDX is 52 in hex).

[0065] Fig. **10** illustrates a fragment of normalized code and an exemplary ODI **100** of the fragment, according to some embodiments of the present. ODI **100** comprises a plurality of codeblock indicators **104a-c,** each codeblock indicator providing a digest *(e.g.,* fingerprint, signature) of a respective code block **74a-c.** An exemplary codeblock indicator **104a-c** comprises the respective opcode pattern **90a-c.** In some embodiments, codeblock indicators **104a-c** comprise hashes of opcode patterns **90a-c,** respectively, as illustrated in Fig. **10.** Beside codeblock indicators **104a-c,** some embodiments of ODI **100** may comprise an object identifier **102** (e.g. a file ID) tagging the respective target object, and/or a set of object feature indicators **106** of the target object. Exemplary object feature indicators comprise a fie size (e.g. 130kB), an indicator of file type (e.g. whether a file is an executable, a DLL, etc.), a memory address of the target object, and a set of numbers indicating an outcome of a set of anti-malware heuristic tests *(e.g.,* whether the target object displays certain malware-specific behaviors or content), among others. In some embodiments, object feature indicators **106** may be computed by AM scanners **42-44,** e.g. during the preliminary scan of the target object (step **202).**

[0066] For simplicity, the rest of the Specification will assume that codeblock indicators **104a-c** comprise hashes of opcode patterns **90a-c.** Execution of step **216** (Fig. **6**) then proceeds as follows. Client AM application **40** may separate the target object into distinct code blocks (illustrated by code blocks **74a-c** in Fig. **10**). For each code block **74a-c,** application **40** may proceed to calculate an opcode pattern **90a-c,** respectively, as shown in Fig. **9**. Application **40** may then invoke hashing engine **54** to compute a hash of opcode pattern **90a-c,** to produce the respective codeblock indicator *(i.e.,* target hash) **104a-c.** Hashing engine **54** may employ a hashing algorithm such as cyclic redundancy check (CRC), message digest (MD), or secure hashing (SHA), among others.

[0067] After computing target ODI **100,** in a step **218** (Fig. **6**), client AM application **40** performs a lookup of the ODI in client-side cache **56.** If the ODI matches a cache record (cache hit), indicating that the respective target object has already been scanned for malware at least once, application **40** proceeds to a step **220,** to label the target object according to the cache record (e.g., clean or malware), and advances to step **232** discussed above.

[0068] If target ODI **100** is not matched in client-side cache **56,** in a step **222** application **40** may invoke client AM communication manager **52** to initiate a client-server scanning transaction. Communication manager **52** transmits target ODI **100** to AM servers **20a-c,** and in a step **224** receives scan report **50** from servers **20a-c.** In some embodiments, each ODI may form part of a distinct client-server scanning transaction, or multiple ODIs may be transmitted simultaneously, within the same transaction (batch processing).

[0069] In a step **226,** application **40** determines whether the target object is whitelisted (clean) according to scan report **50.** If yes, the target object is labeled as non-malicious (step **228**). If the target object is malicious according to scan report **50,** application **40** labels the target object as malware (step **208**).

[0070] Fig. **11** shows an exemplary sequence of steps performed by server AM application **60** (Fig. **5**) according to some embodiments of the present invention. In a step **302,** server AM communication manager **62** receives target ODI **100** from client computer system **30.** In a step **304,** application **60** performs a lookup of ODI **100** in server-side cache **68.** If the ODI

matches a cache record (cache hit), indicating that the respective target object has already been scanned for malware at least once, application **60** proceeds to a step **306,** to label the target object according to the cache record (e.g., clean or malware). In a step **308,** communication manager **62** compiles scan report **50** and transmits report **50** to the respective client computer system **30.**

[0071] If no record of ODI **100** is found in server-side cache **68,** in a step **310** server AM application **60** filters the hashes of ODI **100** to produce a relevant subset of hashes. In some embodiments, hashes of opcode patterns which are not object-specific may be discarded from ODI **100** to improve the performance of malware scanning. Such non-specific opcode patterns correspond for example to unpacker code (e.g. installer, self-extractor) and/or library code, or are present in both clean and malware objects.

[0072] In a step **312,** for each hash of ODI **100,** server AM application **60** may query whitelist database **65** to retrieve a set of whitelisted reference objects containing the respective hash. In some embodiments, a heap-based algorithm is used to rank the retrieved reference objects according to their similarity with the target object.

[0073] In a step **314,** server AM application **60** invokes code comparator **64** to compute a similarity score characterizing how similar the target object is to each whitelisted reference object retrieved in step **312.** In some embodiments, the similarity score is computed according to the formula:

$$S = 100 \cdot \frac{C}{\max(N_T + N_S)},$$ [1]

wherein C denotes the number (count) of hashes common to both the target object and the respective reference object, N_T denotes the number (count) of hashes of the target ODI, filtered as discussed in step **310** above, and wherein N_R denotes the number (count) of hashes of the reference object.

[0074] Alternative embodiments may compute the similarity score according to formulas such as:

$$S = 200 * C / (N_T + N_R) \qquad\qquad [2]$$

or

$$S = 50 * (C/NT + C/NR) \qquad\qquad [3]$$

[0075] In a step 316, application 60 compares the similarity score (e.g., formula [1]) to a predetermined threshold. When the similarity score exceeds the threshold, indicating that the target object is similar to at least one whitelisted object, some embodiments of server AM application 60 may label the target object as non-malicious (clean) in a step 318. An exemplary value of the whitelisting threshold is 50, indicating that a target object is whitelisted when it shares more than 50% of its opcode patterns with a whitelisted object.

[0076] Next, a step 320 updates whitelist database 65 with a record of the current target object, and a step 322 updates server-side cache 68 with a record of the target object and an indicator of the scan result (e.g., clean).

[0077] When the whitelisting similarity score (step 318) does not exceed the threshold, indicating that the target object is not sufficiently similar to any known whitelisted object, server AM application moves on to a step 324, wherein target ODI 100 is compared to a set of records of malware objects. In some embodiments, the set of hashes of ODI 100 is further filtered to remove all hashes which matched records from whitelist database 65 (see step 312 above), therefore retaining a subset of hashes which are not found in any known whitelisted object. For each such unrecognized hash of the target object, code comparator 64 may query malware and/or outbreak databases 66-67 to retrieve a set of malware objects containing the respective hash. In a step 326, code comparator 64 may then proceed to compute a malware similarity score indicating how similar the target object is to each such malware object. In some embodiments, code comparator 64 uses any of the formulae [1-3] described above to compute the malware similarity score.

[0078] A step 328 compares the malware similarity score to a preset threshold. When the malware similarity score exceeds the threshold, indicating that the target object is similar to at

least one malware object stored in databases **66-67,** in a step **330** the target object is labeled as malware. An exemplary threshold for classification as malware is 70 *(i.e.,* the target object shares at least 70% of opcode patterns with a known malware object). Next, malware and/or outbreak databases **66-67** are updated to include a record of the target object. Server-side cache **68** is updated to include a record of the target object and an indicator of its malware status *(e.g.,* infected), and a scan report is compiled and transmitted to the client computer system (step **308).**

[0079] When the malware similarity score does not exceed the threshold, indicating that the target object is not similar to known malware objects, some embodiments of server AM applications may label the target object as whitelisted/non-malicious (step **318),** and update whitelist database **65** accordingly.

[0080] Target ODI **100** may also trigger a malware outbreak alert. In some embodiments, server AM application **60** counts the reference objects from outbreak database **67,** objects which are similar to the target object and have been received by AM server systems **20a-c** within a predetermined timeframe *(e.g.,* the latest 6 hours). When the count exceeds a threshold (e.g., 10), a malware outbreak is assumed and the target object, as well as all reference objects similar to it, are marked as infected. Malware and/or outbreak databases **66-67** are then updated accordingly.

[0081] The exemplary systems and methods described above allow an anti-malware system to maintain a flexible whitelist database, and to use the whitelist database to improve the malware detection performance.

[0082] In conventional whitelisting applications, a hash of a target object (computer file or process) is compared to a set of hashes corresponding to whitelisted objects (objects trusted to be clean). If the hash of the target object matches a whitelisted hash, indicating that the target object is identical to at least one of the whitelisted objects, the target object is trusted and *e.g.,* allowed to execute. Due to certain mathematical properties of hash functions, conventional whitelisting does not allow for variations in the code of whitelisted objects: if two objects differ by as little as one bit, the hashes of the two objects no longer match. Meanwhile, legitimate

computer files and processes may display substantial variations, due for example to differences between compilers or between successive versions of the same software.

[0083] Some embodiments of the systems and methods described above allow an anti-malware system to account for benign differences between data objects, such as differences introduced by compilers and other polymorphisms. A target object is separated into a multitude of code blocks, and a hash is calculated for each code block. The obtained set of target hashes is then compared against a database of hashes corresponding to code blocks extracted from whitelisted objects. A target object may be labeled as whitelisted (trusted) if it has a substantial number of hashes in common with a whitelisted object. Objects which are slightly different from known whitelisted objects may still receive whitelisting status. By allowing a certain degree of mismatch between the sets of hashes of distinct objects, some embodiments of the present invention increase the efficiency of whitelisting without an unacceptable decrease in data safety.

[0084] The size of a code block may be decided according to several criteria. Small code blocks (*e.g.,* a few processor instructions each) may lead to a large number of hashes per target object, which may increase the storage and processing load of the anti-malware server and slow down scanning. On the other hand, small code blocks offer a significant degree of flexibility: if two objects differ only slightly, the differences will be picked up only by a small fraction of hashes, producing a high similarity score. Large code blocks (e.g., several hundreds of processor instructions) produce on average fewer (e.g. several) hashes per target object, and therefore are advantageous from a storage and processing perspective. However, large code blocks suffer the same disadvantage as conventional hashing: small differences between two objects may be picked up by a large proportion of hashes, producing a low similarity score. Testing revealed an optimal code block size of between 5 and 50 processor instructions, and in particular about 5-15 (e.g. -10) instructions, in some embodiments.

[0085] The exemplary systems and methods described above allow an anti-malware system to conduct a collaborative client-server scanning transaction, and to assess the malware status of the target object according to the results of the server-side scan of the target object. Conducting a

part of the malware scan on a remote anti-malware server has a number of advantages over local scanning of target objects on a client computer system.

[0086] The proliferation of malware agents and software in general has contributed to a steady increase in the size of whitelist and malware hash databases, which may amount to several megabytes to several gigabytes of data. The exemplary methods and systems described above allow storing the hash databases on the anti-malware server, thus avoiding the delivery of data-heavy software updates from a corporate server to a large number of customers on a regular basis.

[0087] By performing a significant fraction of malware scanning centrally on the server, the systems and methods described above allow for the timely incorporation of hashes of newly detected malware and of new legitimate software. By contrast, in conventional malware detection wherein scanning is predominantly distributed to client computer systems, information gathering about new security threats and new whitelisted software may involve indirect methods, taking significantly longer to reach the anti-malware software producers.

[0088] The size of files exchanged between client and anti-malware server systems described above is kept to a minimum. Instead of sending entire target objects from the client to the server for server-side scanning, the exemplary methods and systems described above are configured to exchange hashes, which may amount to several bytes to several kilobytes per target object, thus significantly reducing network traffic.

[0089] It will be clear to one skilled in the art that the above embodiments may be altered in many ways without departing from the scope of the invention. Accordingly, the scope of the invention should be determined by the following claims and their legal equivalents.

CLAIMS

What is claimed is:

1. A method comprising:

performing at a client computer system an initial malware scan of a plurality of target objects of the client computer system; and

in response to a tentative determination by the initial malware scan that the target object is suspected of being malicious:

generating at the client computer system a plurality of target hashes of the target object, each target hash representing a distinct code block of the target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor instructions of the target object;

sending from the client computer system the plurality of target hashes to a server computer system connected to the client computer system over a wide area network; and

receiving at the client computer system from the server computer system a server-side indicator of whether the target object is malicious, wherein the server-side indicator is generated by the server computer system by:

for at least a target hash of the plurality of target hashes, retrieving a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a set of whitelisted objects according to the target hash, and when the plurality of target hashes is not identical to the plurality of reference hashes, determining a similarity score according to a count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes; and

when the similarity score exceeds a predetermined threshold, designating the target object as non-malicious.

2.   The method of claim 1, wherein generating the server-side indicator by the computer
        server system comprises:
        when the similarity score does not exceed the predetermined threshold, generating a
                filtered set of target hashes of the target object by filtering all target hashes
                which appear in a database of clean hashes out of the plurality of target hashes
                of the target object; and
        comparing the filtered set of target hashes to a database of malware-identifying
                hashes specific to malware.

3.   The method of claim 1, wherein generating the server-side indicator by the computer
        server system comprises:
        when the similarity score does not exceed the predetermined threshold, generating a
                filtered set of target hashes of the target object by filtering all target hashes
                which appear in a database of clean hashes out of the plurality of target hashes
                of the target object; and
        comparing the filtered set of target hashes to a database of outbreak-detection hashes
                specific to unknown objects reported within a predetermined recent period by
                a plurality of distinct client computer systems connected to the server
                computer system.

4. A method comprising:
    receiving at a server computer system a plurality of target hashes of a target object of a
            client computer system connected to the server computer system over a wide area
            network, wherein the plurality of target hashes are generated at the client
            computer system in response to a tentative determination by the client computer
            system that the target object is suspected of being malicious, the tentative
            determination resulting from an initial malware scan of a plurality of target
            objects of the client computer system;
    generating at the server computer system a server-side indicator of whether the target
            object is malicious by:

for at least a target hash of the plurality of target hashes, retrieving a plurality of

reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a

set of whitelisted objects according to the target hash, and when the

plurality of target hashes is not identical to the plurality of reference

hashes, determining a similarity score according to a count of hashes

common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of

reference hashes, and

when the similarity score exceeds a predetermined threshold, designating the

target object as non-malicious; and

sending to the client computer system the server-side indicator of whether the target

object is malicious.

5.   The method of claim 4, wherein generating the server-side indicator by the computer

server system comprises:

when the similarity score does not exceed the predetermined threshold, generating a

filtered set of target hashes of the target object by filtering all target hashes

which appear in a database of clean hashes out of the plurality of target hashes

of the target object; and

comparing the filtered set of target hashes to a database of malware-identifyitig

hashes specific to malware.

6.   The method of claim 4, wherein generating the server-side indicator by the computer

server system comprises:

when the similarity score does not exceed the predetermined threshold, generating a

filtered set of target hashes of the target object by filtering all target hashes

which appear in a database of clean hashes out of the plurality of target hashes

of the target object; and

comparing the filtered set of target hashes to a database of outbreak-detection hashe s

specific to unknown objects reported within a predetermined recent period by

a plurality of distinct client computer systems connected to the server

computer system.

7. A method comprising:

receiving at a server computer system a plurality of target hashes of a target object, each target hash representing a distinct code block of the target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor instructions of the target object;

for at least a target hash of the plurality of target hashes, employing the server computer system to:

retrieve a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a set of whitelisted objects according to the target hash, and

when the plurality of target hashes is not identical to the plurality of reference hashes, determine a similarity score according to a count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes; and

when the similarity score exceeds a predetermined threshold, employing the server computer system to label the target object as non-malicious.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein the target hash comprises a hash of an opcode pattern, the opcode pattern comprising a sequence of instruction indicators, each instruction indicator indicative of a processor instruction of the distinct code block.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein the sequence of processor instructions consists of between 5 and 50 consecutive processor instructions.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein the sequence of processor instructions consists of between 5 and 15 consecutive processor instructions.

11. The method of claim 7, wherein the sequence of processor instructions starts with a CALL instruction.

12.   The method of claim 7, further comprising:

performing a code normalization procedure on the target object to produce a normalized target object, and wherein each distinct code block consists of a sequence of computer instructions of the normalized target object; and

applying a hash function to the distinct code block to produce the target hash.

13.   The method of claim 7, wherein the similarity score is determined as a function of:

$$C/\max(N_T, N_R)$$

wherein C denotes the count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes, while N_T and N_R denote the cardinality of the plurality of target hashes and the cardinality of the plurality of reference hashes, respectively.

14.   The method of claim 7, wherein the similarity score is determined as a function of:

$$C/(N_T + N_R)$$

wherein C denotes the count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes, while N_T and N_R denote the cardinality of the plurality of target hashes and the cardinality of the plurality of reference hashes, respectively.

15.   The method of claim 7, wherein the similarity score is determined as a function of:

$$C/N_T + C/N_R$$

wherein C denotes the count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes, while N_T and N_R denote the cardinality of the plurality of target hashes and the cardinality of the plurality of reference hashes, respectively.

16.   The method of claim 7, wherein the target object comprises a computer file.

17.   The method of claim 7, wherein the target object comprises a computer process.

18.   A computer system comprising at least a processor programmed to:
        receive a plurality of target hashes, each target hash representing a distinct code block of
            a target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor
            instructions of the target object;
        for at least a target hash of the plurality of target hashes:
            retrieve a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object
                selected from a set of whitelisted objects according to the target hash, and
                when the plurality of target hashes is not identical to the plurality of reference
                    hashes, determine a similarity score according to a count of hashes
                    common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of
                    reference hashes; and
        when the similarity score exceeds a predetermined threshold, label the target object as
            non-malicious.

19.   The system of claim 18, wherein the target hash comprises a hash of an opcode
        pattern, the opcode pattern comprising a sequence of instruction indicators, each
        instruction indicator indicative of a processor instruction of the distinct code block.

20.   The system of claim 18, wherein the sequence of processor instructions consists of
        between 5 and 50 consecutive processor instructions.

21.   The system of claim 20, wherein the sequence of processor instructions consists of
        between 5 and 15 consecutive processor instructions.

22.   The system of claim 18, wherein the sequence of processor instructions starts with a
        CALL instruction.

23.   The system of claim 18, wherein the processor is further programmed to:
        perform a code normalization procedure on the target object to produce a normalized
            target object, wherein each distinct code block consists of a sequence of
            computer instructions of the normalized target object; and

apply a hash function to the distinct code block to produce the target hash.

24.   The system of claim 18, wherein the similarity score is determined as a function of:

$$C/max(N_T, N_R)$$

wherein C denotes the count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes, while N_T and N_R denote the cardinality of the plurality of target hashes and the cardinality of the plurality of reference hashes, respectively.

25.   The system of claim 18, wherein the similarity score is determined as a function of:

$$C/(N_T + N_R)$$

wherein C denotes the count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes, while N_T and N_R denote the cardinality of the plurality of target hashes and the cardinality of the plurality of reference hashes, respectively.

26.   The system of claim 18, wherein the similarity score is determined as a function of:

$$C/N_T + C/N_R$$

wherein C denotes the count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes, while N_T and N_R denote the cardinality of the plurality of target hashes and the cardinality of the plurality of reference hashes, respectively.

27.   The system of claim 18, wherein the target object comprises a computer file.

28.   The system of claim 18, wherein the target object comprises a computer process.

29.   A computer system comprising:

   means for receiving a plurality of target hashes, each target hash representing a distinct code block of a target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor instructions of the target object;

   means for retrieving a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a set of whitelisted objects according to a selected target hash of the plurality of target hashes;

   means for determining a similarity score according to a count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes; and

   means for labeling the target object as non-malicious according to the similarity score.

30.   A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium encoding instructions which, when executed on a processor, cause the processor to perform the steps of:

   receiving a plurality of target hashes, each target hash representing a distinct code block of a target object, each distinct code block consisting of a sequence of processor instructions of the target object;

   for at least a target hash of the plurality of target hashes:

      retrieving a plurality of reference hashes of a reference object, the reference object selected from a set of whitelisted objects according to the target hash, and

      when the plurality of target hashes is not identical to the plurality of reference hashes, determining a similarity score according to a count of hashes common to both the plurality of target hashes and the plurality of reference hashes; and

   when the similarity score exceeds a predetermined threshold, labeling the target object as non-malicious.

31.   A method comprising:

   receiving at a server computer system a plurality of target hashes, each target hash representing a distinct data block of a target object of a client computer system

4   connected to the server computer system, each distinct code block consisting of a

5   sequence of processor instructions of the target object;

6   in response to receiving the plurality of target hashes, employing the server computer

7   system to retrieve a plurality of reference hashes representing a whitelisted data

8   object, and

9   in response to determining that the plurality of target hashes is not identical to the

10   plurality of reference hashes, and determining that the plurality of target hashes

11   and the plurality of reference hashes share a majority of items, labeling the target

12   object as non-malicious.

13

1/8

FIG. 1

FIG. 2

2/8

FIG. 3

FIG. 4

3/8

FIG. 5

4/8

FIG. 6

5/8

```
PUSH EBP                     ; EBP will be replaced with EAX
MOV EBP, ESP                 ; ESP will be replaced with ECX
                             ; end of function prolog -> will be removed
PUSH EAX                     ; EAX will be replaced with EDX
XOR EAX, EAX                 ; sets EAX to 0 -> will be removed
MOV EAX, 0x4                 ; MOV operation -> removed
ADD EAX, 0x7                 ; replaced with ADD EDX, 0x0
SUB EAX, 0x0                 ; does not modify EAX -> removed
CMP EAX, 0x10                ; CMP operation -> removed
JE 0x405600                  ; replaced with JE 0x0
PUSH 0x2
POP EBX                      ; PUSH followed by POP -> replaced with MOV EBX,
                             ;    0x0, and therefore removed
SUB EAX, EBX                 ; replaced with SUB EDX, EBX
CALL 0x401000                ; replaced with CALL 0x0
JMP 0x401200                 ; replaced with JMP 0x0
PUSH EDX                     ; EDX will be replaced with ESP
MOV EDX, 2                   ; MOV operation -> removed
XOR EDX, EAX                 ; replaced with XOR ESP, EDX
TEST EAX, EAX                ; TEST operation -> removed
JNZ 0x402006                 ; replaced with JNE 0x0
LEA ECX, [ECX + 0x0]         ; replaced with MOV EBP, 0 and removed
PUSH ECX                     ; replaced with PUSH EBP
PUSH EAX                     ; replaced with PUSH EDX
CALL 0x401000                ; replaced with CALL 0x0
MOV ESP, EBP
POP EBP                      ; end of function epilog -> removed
```

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```
PUSH EDX
ADD EDX, 0
JE 0x0
SUB EDX, EBX          74
CALL 0x0
JMP 0x0
PUSH ESP
XOR ESP, EDX
JNE 0x0
PUSH EBP
PUSH EDX

CALL 0x0
```

FIG. 7

6/8

Prefix	Opcode	Opcode	Mod Reg R/M	Displacement/Data
	10000000		11110001	00010010

82a   82b   82c   82d   82e

80

FIG. 8

PUSH EDX	52
ADD EDX, 0	03 D2 0
JE 0x0	74
SUB EDX, EBX	2B D2 D3
CALL 0x0	FF 50
JMP 0x0	EB
PUSH ESP	50 D4
XOR ESP, EDX	33 D4 D2
JNE 0x0	75
PUSH EBP	50 D5
PUSH EDX	52

90

74

FIG. 9

7/8

```
push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
push    0FFFFFFFFh
push    address
mov     eax, large fs:0
push    eax
mov     large fs:0, esp
sub     esp, 4B4h
mov     [ebp+4], ecx
lea     ecx, [ebp+4]
call    Function
mov     [ebp+4], 0
call    API_Function
mov     [ebp+12], eax
mov     eax, [ebp+12]
push    eax
```
74a

```
lea     ecx, [ebp+4]
push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
push    0FFFFFFFFh
push    address
mov     eax, large fs:0
push    eax
mov     large fs:0, esp
sub     esp, 4B4h
mov     [ebp+4], ecx
lea     ecx, [ebp+4]
call    Function
mov     [ebp+4], 0
call    API_Function
mov     [ebp+12], eax
mov     eax, [ebp+12]
push    eax
```
74b

```
call    Function
mov     [ebp+var_4BC], eax
jmp     short loc_4011AD
mov     [ebp+var_4BC], 0
mov     edx, [ebp+var_4BC]
mov     [ebp+var_498], edx
mov     byte ptr [ebp+var_4],0
mov     eax, [ebp+var_4B8]
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_498]
mov     [eax+0C4h], ecx
mov     edx, [ebp+var_4B8]
mov     ecx, [edx+0C4h]
```

```
call    API_Function
mov     [ebp+12], eax
lea     ecx, [ebp+12]
call    API_Function
push    eax
lea     ecx, [ebp+4]
call    API_Function
push    eax
mov     eax, [ebp+12]
mov     ecx, [eax+16]
call    sub_404340
mov     [ebp+12], eax
cmp     [ebp+12], 0
jz      label
mov     ecx, [ebp+4]
cmp     dword ptr [ecx+4],0
jz      label
mov     edx, [ebp+4]
```
74c

90a

90b

90c

| Opcode Pattern |
| Opcode Pattern |
| Opcode Pattern |

102

| FID |
14ABF226	104a
4DE12216	104b
883252A6	104c
...
0
1	106
130
...

100

FIG. 10

8/8

FIG. 11

```
Receive target ODI from
client computer system                    302
        │
        ▼
   ◇ Target ODI in ◇  ──YES──▶  Label target object
     server-side cache?          according to server-side cache
        │                                │
        NO                               ▼
        │                          Send scan report to
  Filter codeblock indicators      client computer system
  to produce relevant subset             │
        │                                ▼
        ▼                          Update server-side cache
  Retrieve reference hash sets           │
  from whitelist DB                      ▼
        │                          Update whitelist/
        ▼                          malware/outbreak DBs
  Compute whitelisting                   ▲
  similarity score                       │
        │                                │
        ▼                                │
   ◇  High  ◇  ──YES──▶  Label target object
     whitelisting score?    as non-malicious
        │                        ▲
        NO                       │
        │                       318
        ▼
  Retrieve reference hash sets
  from malware/outbreak DB
        │
        ▼
  Compute malware/outbreak
  similarity score
        │
        ▼
   ◇  High  ◇  ──NO──────────────────────┐
     malware/outbreak                     │
     score?                               │
        │                                 │
        YES                               │
        │                                 ▼
        └──────────▶  Label target object
                      as malware
```

306
302
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INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER
INV. G06F21/56
ADD.

According to International Patent Classification (IPC) or to both national classification and IPC

B. FIELDS SEARCHED

Minimum documentation searched (classification system followed by classification symbols)
G06F

Documentation searched other than minimum documentation to the extent that such documents are included in the fields searched

Electronic data base consulted during the international search (name of data base and, where practicable, search terms used)

EPO-Internal , WPI Data

C. DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT

Category*	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
X	US 2008/263669 A1 (ALME CHRISTOPH [DE]) 23 October 2008 (2008-10-23) paragraph [0015] - paragraph [0116] -----	1,2,5, 7-11, 13-22, 24-31
A	US 2011/093426 A1 (H0GLUND MICHAEL GREGORY [US]) 21 April 2011 (2011-04-21) paragraph [0017] - paragraph [0082] -----	1-31
A	US 2008/040804 A1 (OLIVER IAN [AU] ET AL) 14 February 2008 (2008-02-14) paragraph [0135] - paragraph [0146] -----	1-31
A	US 2008/209557 A1 (HERLEY C0RMAC E [US] ET AL) 28 August 2008 (2008-08-28) paragraph [0021] - paragraph [0045] -----	1-31

☐ Further documents are listed in the continuation of Box C.   ☒ See patent family annex.

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"E" earlier application or patent but published on or after the international filing date	"X" document of particular relevance; the claimed invention cannot be considered novel or cannot be considered to involve an inventive step when the document is taken alone
"L" documentwhich may throw doubts on priority claim(s) orwhich is cited to establish the publication date of another citation or other special reason (as specified)	"Y" document of particular relevance; the claimed invention cannot be considered to involve an inventive step when the document is combined with one or more other such documents, such combination being obvious to a person skilled in the art
"O" document referring to an oral disclosure, use, exhibition or other means	
"P" document published prior to the international filing date but later than the priority date claimed	"&" document member of the same patent family

Date of the actual completion of the international search	Date of mailing of the international search report
3 May 2013	15/05/2013

Name and mailing address of the ISA/ European Patent Office, P.B. 5818 Patentlaan 2 NL - 2280 HV Rijswijk Tel. (+31-70) 340-2040, Fax: (+31-70) 340-3016	Authorized officer Jascau, Adrian

1

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

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